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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In early 2014, English School researcher Alex Bellamy posted an article on the 
website Global Observatory. Its title was Libyan Case a Red Herring in Syrian 
Dilemma.1 The article argues that, contrary to mass media’s ‘preoccupation’, the 
Libyan intervention in 2011, and its aftermath, had no effect on the debate in the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council regarding Syria. How can this be? Are they not 
similar cases in nature? Both cases involve a dictator slaughtering his people, trying 
to keep his regime in power. Both crises began in 2011, one soon after the other. Both 
cases were part of the Arab Spring. Can it be that the response to one crisis, and the 
effects of this response, has no effect on the response to one so similar? Is it not 
natural to expect an organisation such as the United Nations to learn from the past? In 
the article, Bellamy states that: 
 
Voting patterns and statements offered in the Council’s Syria debates as 
well as the Council’s wider practice since 2011 provide little evidence of 
a direct link between the two cases. 
 
However, according to statements made (outside the Council) in 2011 and 2012 by 
Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the 
main point of contention is that of the regime change that followed the intervention in 
Libya: the Western powers, alleges Russia, used the UN mandate as a pretext to 
topple the Gaddafi regime. 2, 3 
 
Which is the truth? This paper investigates the debate in the Security Council, seeking 
to find if the Libyan intervention really has had no visible effect on the deliberations 
as to what response was appropriate in regards to Syria. 
 
Thus, the problem formulation guiding the research:  
 
Has the 2011 Libyan intervention and its aftermath influenced the debate on 
intervention in Syria? 
                                                      
1 Bellamy 2014 
2 Financial Times 2011 
3 RIA Novosti 2012 
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Why do we want to know this? Syria is an ongoing crisis. Hundreds of thousands 
have been killed in a brutal civil war, with millions fleeing to neighbouring countries 
and Europe. It affects the entirety of the Levant, Turkey and Europe: apart from 
purely humanitarian issues, terrorists and violent, radical Islamists have found a haven 
in the lawlessness. So have Kurdish separatists. 
Will the United Nations do anything about it? What will they do? When will they do 
it? What is stopping them? The debate in the Security Council may offer some hint. 
Analysing the relevance of one perhaps crucial factor in the debate over what an 
adequate international response would be will allow us to understand more about the 
past, present and future of this crisis that affects millions of people. 
 
Next, I will present a number of research questions to aid in guiding the research. In 
the chapters following that, I will present the theoretical framework; a review of 
selected literature; methodology and data; context – and finally, the analysis. 
 
All references to the Syrian ‘regime’ or ‘government’ refer exclusively to the 
internationally recognised Syrian Arab Republic. 
Research questions 
1. Which permanent members of the UN Security Council argue for intervening 
in Syria, and which argue against? 
2. To what extent do the arguments include relate to: 
a. Regime change? 
b. Non-intervention? 
c. The Responsibility to Protect? 
d. Intervention? 
 
The Security Council has fifteen seats, ten of which rotate between member states, of 
which five are permanently held by China, Russia, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France. The paper focuses on the five permanent members of the 
Security Council (P5) due to their wielding veto power and thus outsize influence in 
the Council.  
The first research question lays the foundation for the analysis. It asks which 
permanent members argue for, and which against intervening in Syria. The data; 
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arguments in the Council, will be seen theoretically as a debate – grounded in the 
framework provided by the English School of International Relations – between those 
seeking further international intervention in order to defend individual human rights, 
and those who would rather protect the rights of states. It is my expectation that the 
debate in the Security Council will present itself as conducive to such framing; 
primarily two-sided, and traceable to a difference in normative views on what 
international society should be like. Should it act as a world police, intervening 
wherever humanitarian law is violated?4 Or should it try to preserve the status quo, 
emphasising respect for states’ right to territorial sovereignty? This connection is 
founded in the theoretical framework chosen for this paper, which is the pluralist-
solidarist debate within the English School. 
The Responsibility to Protect can be seen as an attempt to codify what the response of 
the UN should be in cases where these two views collide; where rights of states and 
the rights of individuals collide. Therefore statements regarding it may be especially 
salient; therefore a research sub-question has been devoted to it. 
‘Regime change’ relates to the particularly controversial regime change in Libya. 
Critics believed NATO forces went further in implementing the mandate the UN 
Security Council had given them than certain great powers – namely Russia and 
China, being permanent members of the Council of as well as many other lesser 
powers, including Brazil, India and South Africa.5 NATO forces had gone further in 
their violation of Libya’s sovereignty; but in order to save civilians. The 2011 Libya 
intervention is an extraordinary and practical example of the clash between the 
protection of state sovereignty and the protection of individual human rights. Part of 
the English School of International Relations, within which this paper lies 
theoretically, deals with just this clash.  
 
The paper seeks to explain the deliberations on the Syrian crisis using concepts from 
the English School. We can position the Libyan intervention within this framework as 
a particularly salient event, and see how this event affects the positions of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council who carry the decisive vetoes. 
The three other research questions may capture relevant data that is not captured by 
the very narrow category regime change. They will provide additional data on the 
                                                      
4 What is humanitarian law? The International Committee of the Red Cross provides an overview at https://www.icrc.org/en/war-
and-law. 
5 The Guardian 23 March 2011 
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debate with which to elaborate on the data collected under regime change. This part of 
the paper aims to position the Libyan intervention in a theoretically founded context 
spanning the years 2011-2015, seeing how the attitudes to Libya of respective P5 
members can be seen as part of a general and coherent attitude to international 
society. With this coherent picture of the attitudes of the P5 and the division between 
the two sides it is possible to explain what the Libyan intervention means for the 
debate on the Syrian civil war.  
Intervention deals with those statements relating to interventions in Syria, including 
non-military ones. 
Non-intervention deals with those statements arguing against intervention in Syria. 
 
I will now elaborate the theory and literature upon which these research questions are 
founded. 
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Chapter 2:Theoretical framework 
The English School is a theory of international relations that seeks to transcend the 
divisions of the classical theoretical trinity of realism, liberalism and Marxism.  
According to Robert Jackson, the English School is:  
 
a variety of theoretical inquiries which conceive of international relations as a 
world not merely of power or prudence or wealth or capability or domination, 
but also one of recognition, association, membership, equality, equity, 
legitimate interest, rights, reciprocity, customs and conventions, agreements 
and disagreements, disputes, offenses, injuries, damages, reparations, and the 
rest: the normative vocabulary of human conduct.6 
 
The school seeks to go beyond the three more rigid classical theories named above by 
incorporating material and ideational factors within the same framework. 7  The 
English School aims to reflect more adequately the diverse values that state actors – 
or more specifically, the individuals who represent them – try to balance when 
fashioning and pursuing their foreign policy: realism representing the national 
responsibilities; rationalism the international responsibilities, and revolutionism the 
humanitarian responsibilities.8 
 
Thus, the English School, introducing a theoretical pluralism, can be divided into 
three branches: the Hobbesian/Machiavellian-realist camp; the Grotian-rationalist 
camp, and the Kantian-revolutionary camp.9 
There are significant differences between the three branches’ conceptions of inter-
state relations. Together they place themselves along a spectrum in terms of using 
ideational and material analytical factors. The realist camp lies at the one end of it, 
focusing mostly on material factors. At the other, ideational, end, lies the revolutionist 
camp. The rationalist camp occupies a field somewhere in the middle.  
The Kantian-revolutionary conception of the subject matter of international relations 
is highly idealistic – indeed, it comes from the writings of famous idealist Immanuel 
Kant. It treats the world population as one - a single population that can share norms 
                                                      
6 Jackson 1992: 271; quoted from Buzan, 2004: 6 
7 Buzan 2004: 1-27 
8 Jackson 2000: 169-178 through Buzan 2004: 8 
9 ibid 
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and institutions; indeed, is constituted by these things held in common.10 This is its 
analytical object, the world society. In contrast, the Hobbesian/Machiavellian-realist 
camp is concerned with the structure and realpolitik of the classically realist 
conception of global inter-state anarchy. Its analytical object is the state. 
The third camp, the one of the Grotian-rationalists, provides the main body of 
research within the English School. It, too, conceives of the world as consisting of 
states, but focuses on the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and 
institutions between these states (such as the UN).11 Together, these constitute the 
international society, and this is its analytical object. 
 
Just as world society owes its existence to shared norms and institutions, so does 
international society. Research into international society concerns itself with the 
shared norms and institutions that exist between nations (or rather, nation-states).  
The purpose of these norms is to restrain the actions of states in international society. 
If a state does not behave within these norms, other states may apply punitive 
measures – just as in any society; between states, between people. You can break the 
rules as you wish, but you will suffer the consequences – ranging from temporary 
sanctions to permanent exclusion from the given society. 
 
Despite its name, one of the strengths of the rationalist camp is within it, one can 
move relatively freely between rationalism and constructivism between each research 
programme. It can borrow ideas from the world society such as that of universal 
human rights, or it can analyse the norm-based international society with a very 
rationalist epistemology.  
None of the above concepts exist only as objects of discussion. They are aspects of 
reality as much as theoretical constructs – just as the Cold War was, for instance. 
According to Buzan, English School theory can be viewed in three separate, but 
potentially overlapping ways: 
 
1. As a set of ideas to be found in the minds of statesmen; 
2. As a set of ideas to be found in the minds of political theorists, or 
                                                      
10 Buzan 2004: 6-10; 27-62 
11 Buzan 2004: 6-10 
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3. As a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social 
structures of the international system. 12 
 
The concepts are archetypes. Reality is – of course – less clear-cut. With that in mind, 
the next section will describe the pluralist-solidarist debate within the Grotian camp. 
Pluralism and solidarism; order and justice 
Within the Grotian camp exists a normative debate of pluralists versus solidarists, a 
dialectic originally conceived by Hedley Bull.13 
For a champion of solidarism, see Nicholas Wheeler’s 2000 book, Saving Strangers; 
for the pluralist case, see Robert Jackson’s 2001 book, The Global Covenant.14, 15 
Recalling that they are extremes of the moderate Grotian camp; pluralists and 
solidarists both acknowledge an inter-state order. The distinction between the two is 
to be found in their views as to how norms should govern the international order.16 
 
Pluralists hold dearest the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention 
(intervention in another state’s affairs violates their sovereignty). The word pluralist 
signifies their preference for an international order between a multitude of states that 
respects a plurality of attitudes (to justice). Therefore it is beyond the rights of any 
state to interfere in the affairs of another.  
Solidarists, drawing on Grotius himself, privilege the rights of individuals above the 
rights of states. 17 If a regime (grossly) mistreats its people, it forfeits its legitimacy as 
a sovereign power. This willingness to change the status quo in honour of certain 
ideals puts rationalism in the centre-left on the border of rationalism and 
revolutionism. Solidarism, thus, is progressive, and has no particular affinity for the 
status quo. 
Pluralism, on the other hand, can be said to favour the status quo, and is the 
conservative position.  
 
                                                      
12 Buzan 2004: 12 
13 Bull 1977 
14 Jackson 2001 
15 Wheeler 2000 
16 Wheeler 2000: 11-13 
17 Wheeler 2000: 45 
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The central dilemma, balancing the rights – the sovereignty – of the state with the 
rights of the individual, can be seen as a trade-off between order and justice. 
Pluralists privilege order; solidarists privilege justice.   
This conceptual couple is apt at shedding light on one of the most important debates 
in international society, that between those who are not shy of intervening abroad in 
pursuit of justice, and those nations who deem these interventions an unacceptable 
breach of state sovereignty.18 There is a clash of norms that are both fundamental to 
the international society: that of state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic 
affairs and that of the respect for human rights. The respect for human rights is 
codified in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the 
respect for state sovereignty in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations.19,
 20 
 
Such international laws and treaties are difficult to maintain in such a framework, as 
there is a lack of enforcement mechanism. If the state breaches international law, what 
can international society do to enforce it? How far can it go? Certainly, it can enforce 
sanctions within the realm of the international society – but is it entitled to intervene 
directly into domestic affairs? Pluralists say no. They privilege the territorial 
sovereignty of the state; the rights of the state.  
Solidarists may counter that the state’s legitimacy relies on the acceptance of the 
people.21 Thus, if a regime subverts democracy in order to stay in power, this will 
rank as a matter that allows the international society to intervene in order to protect 
the rights of the people (this does not automatically mean intervening by force; force 
is only to be used as a last resort). 22 Thus, the rights of people rank above the rights 
of the state. Pluralists can posit another counter-argument to this: by intervening in 
domestic affairs, you also breach international law. This compromises order. Order is 
a prerequisite for justice. The choice, then, is between two imperfect options.  
Previously the international society has been able to agree on intervention in the event 
of the host government agreeing to this, such as the provision of aid in the 1990s 
Yugoslavia ethnic conflict. Such initiatives protect human rights without offending 
the sovereignty of states.23, 24 In the case of the 2011 Libyan intervention, the Security 
                                                      
18 See for instance UN document S.PV/6531 
19 http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
20 http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/ 
21 Wheeler 2000: 30, 62-6, 248 
22 Wheeler 2000: 33-5 
23 Wheeler 2000: 200 
24 UN Security Council Resolution 770 
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Council authorised a military intervention without an invitation from the host regime 
for the first time. That this led to the toppling of the regime in question may or may 
not have surprised the international society at the time, but it did lead to an uproar 
among many prominent members of it.25, 26 
 
Solidarists will say that they sought to defend individual human rights, and can blame 
pluralists for neglecting them, but a pluralist might ask: what is left behind? Is it 
better? The debate exists thus not purely in the clouds, but relates to the very real 
consequences of action and inaction. As described in the introduction, the intervention 
in Libya has left a country in chaos. The pluralist contention that the interventionist 
pursuit of justice leaves chaos in its wake is an illustration of the fact that pluralist 
opposition is not only based on pure principle, but on real assumptions and fears 
about the impact of certain actions on the world. This chaos, of course, may not be 
good for human rights. To illustrate: one could argue that spending a trillion dollars 
on removing the violent regime of Saddam Hussein was a lousy trade, when one is 
left with IS.  
This, then, is the pluralist argument played out vis-à-vis solidarism. The solidarist 
counter-argument could be that there are sweet spots (so to speak) where order and 
justice are compatible – i.e. an operation that achieves humanitarian goals – and even 
narrowly defined national interest – but does not leave behind further chaos. Finding 
this sweet spot may however involve a terrible gamble – one that pluralists are not a 
as a rule willing to make.  
 
This chapter has described the theoretical framework for the analysis. It is possible to 
see the Libyan intervention as a debate between those who see it as a breach of 
sovereignty vis-à-vis those who see it as an operation that saved civilian lives – qua 
the Bellamy article, and the statements by Medvedev and Lavrov. The similar, Syrian, 
case will be delved into with this framework. Having introduced the theory, we can 
ask: has the Libyan intervention increased the divide in the P5, between pluralist and 
solidarist members, and can we trace this in the debates on the Syrian civil war? 
                                                      
25 Bellamy 2015 
26 UN document S.PV/6531 
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Chapter 3: Literature 
The 2000 book by University of Birmingham professor Nicholas Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers is a significant inspiration to this paper. In the book, Wheeler analyses the 
debate in international society on (unilateral, not UN-mandated) humanitarian 
interventions during and after the Cold War – in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Uganda 
– and in the 1990s – in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia.27 The book argues 
that the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention was significantly strengthened in the 
ten years after the Cold War.28  
 
Barry Buzan, emeritus professor of International Relations at the London School of 
Economics, has criticised English School research for focussing overly on the 
systemic or global level and neglecting regional organisations such as the African 
Union or the European Union; and for focussing overly on the relationship between 
the individual and the state - indeed, such as this paper does; focussing on the conflict, 
in the international society, on the global-systemic level, between the rights of the 
state and the rights of the individual.29  
This may be true. However, in the matter of a large-scale multilateral intervention in 
the Syrian crisis, I will claim for the purpose of this paper that it is most likely to 
come from the UN Security Council, and that it therefore is the most relevant 
institution. The crisis also affects several regions, including North Africa, the Middle 
East, Central Asia, Russia, China and Europe. Therefore this paper looks at the 
global-systemic level; therefore it looks at the Council, and not at regional 
organisations. 
Dale Copeland has also written a lengthy critique of the English School, arguing that 
American realist theory ‘remains a more useful starting point…for building strong 
explanatory and predictive IR theory’.30 
He criticises the School for being ‘less a theory that provides falsifiable hypotheses to 
be tested (or that have been tested) than a vague approach to thinking about and 
conceptualising world politics.’  
This critique is illustrative of the debate that characterises the English School, 
between rationalists and constructivists. Copeland lands squarely in the rationalist 
                                                      
27 Wheeler 2000 
28 ibid: 
29 Buzan 2004: 16-8 
30 Copeland 2003 
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camp, arguing for the English School to focus on its realist and rationalist heritage. 
This paper, however, can be placed instead in the constructivist camp, populated 
among others by Nicholas Wheeler, who is a key inspiration for the paper.  
Constructivist English School theory is not in the habit of providing rigid hypotheses, 
but rather sees truth as a malleable entity. Instead, this paper will outline a frame of 
argument(s) based on the reading of theoretical and empirical literature, that 
effectively outlines how the debate on the floor of the Security Council will take 
place.   
 
The second critique that Copeland levels against the English School is that it ignores 
the key tenet of the international anarchy that leaders cannot be but uncertain about 
the present and future intentions of others. This critique relates to the view of Aidan 
Hehir 31  that humanitarian aims are second to the national interest – i.e. that 
humanitarian goals will only be pursued when a realist analysis of the situation allows 
for it.  
Wheeler, however, in Saving Strangers, argues (echoing Tony Blair) that ‘there is 
often a mutual compatibility between protecting the national interest, promoting 
international order, and enforcing human rights.’32, 33 A sweet spot. In the analytical 
and concluding chapters it will be shown how this concept is also present in the 
debate in the Council. 
 
Aidan Hehir has been involved in a debate with Tim Dunne and Katherine Gelber 
about whether or not the R2P had any impact on the debates regarding the Libya 
intervention. 34, 35, 36 Gelber and Dunne list how heads of government, heads of state, 
Security Council ambassadors and other state representatives frequently used R2P 
keywords such as ‘atrocities’, ‘war crimes’ and others in the run-up to the Libyan 
intervention. They argue that this is indicatory of R2P having an effect on the 
decision-making process. 
In response, Hehir argues several points:  
• That there is no causal link between the two; 
                                                      
31 Hehir 2010 through Gundersen 2012 
32 Wheeler 2000: 267 
33 Blair 1999 
34 Dunne & Gelber 2014 
35 Dunne & Gelber 2015 
36 Hehir 2015 
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• That there has been no change in humanitarian intervention practice after the 
adoption of R2P in 2005-6; and 
• That the keywords were used commonly before the adoption of R2P. 
 
In a rebuttal of Hehir’s criticism, Dunne & Gelber reaffirm their conclusion that R2P 
was an enabling condition of the intervention; that explicit mention of R2P is not 
needed in order to conclude that R2P had an effect, merely R2P language.37 They 
argue essentially that Hehir is criticising a constructivist conclusion from a positivist 
perspective, and thus more or less invalidating it. 
This discussion nevertheless affected the choice of keywords for this paper. The 
keywords only include words that are actually mentioned in the UN document 
adopting R2P.  
 
Both sides, however, agree that the moral argumentation was inconsistent during the 
Libya crisis, and that this weakened the legitimacy of the UN mandated action. This 
also brings up the question of whether we should really talk about R2P rather than 
simply the broader term: humanitarian intervention. This paper has taken a broader 
theoretical perspective; that of the English School (while including R2P in that 
perspective). 
 
Alex Bellamy, as mentioned in the introduction, writes that there is ‘little evidence of 
a direct link between the two cases,’ despite the media’s preoccupation with such a 
link.38 He claims that statements in the Syria debates offers little evidence thereof. 
Also, between the adoption of the R2P in 2005 and until the 2011 intervention, the 
Council invoked R2P four times. After the intervention, the Council invoked it ten 
times; in resolutions on Mali, South Sudan, the Ivory Coast, Yemen and the Central 
African Republic (CAR).  
This, however, contradicts what Russian Prime Minister Medvedev, and Foreign 
Minister Lavrov have both stated. Perhaps in these other cases there is not a legitimate 
fear of a forced regime change. There clearly is grounds for such a fear in Syria, with 
Western powers for a long time stating that ‘Assad must go’.39 
 
                                                      
37 Dunne & Gelber 2015 
38 Bellamy 2014 
39 BBC News 28-9-15 
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Having given an account of selected relevant literature relating to this paper, I now 
turn to the research methodology. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Research strategy & pre-data collection methodological considerations  
This paper can be categorised as an empirically focused single-case study looking 
essentially at how the Libyan intervention can be traced in the Syrian case. 
 
A case study is defined by Woodside as: 
 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.40 
 
Thus, a case study naturally (as a rule) has limited generalisability beyond the specific 
case. The case in question is the deliberation in the Council over whether to intervene 
in the Syrian crisis/civil war. Single-case studies seek to explain the case as a singular 
phenomenon rather than trying to explain it alongside a host of other related 
phenomena. It provides in-depth knowledge. It may be that the particular 
phenomenon has special traits. It may be, as quoted above, that the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.  
The case investigated in this paper can be categorised as a theory-guided case, where 
the aim is to explain and/or interpret a single historical episode rather than to 
generalise beyond the data. Theory-guided case studies such as this one begin with a 
well-elaborated theoretical framework that ‘focuses attention on some theoretically 
specified aspects of reality and neglects others’. 41  This approach is a type of 
idiographic research strategy, an approach that seeks to explain the specific, 
individual case – as opposed to the nomothetic approach, which prioritises the 
capability to make generalisations to other similar cases.42, 43 
The value of such a case study is naturally closely related to the case itself. The value 
of this case study is as a rigorous and theoretically guided explanation of a debate 
within the UN Security Council that through the Syrian case is of importance to the 
maintenance of stability and human rights in the Middle East, with a significant 
impact also on Europe in the form of refugees. 
                                                      
40 Woodside 2010: 16 
41 Levy 2008 
42 ibid 
43 Thomas 2011 
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This case study has an empirical focus, grounding the conclusions in a survey of 
almost five years of meetings of the Council.  
 
The method used in this paper is largely based on a method of qualitative analysis 
conceived by Udo Kuckartz.44 It has the name qualitative text analysis and aims to 
draw the best from (quantitative) content analysis and (qualitative) hermeneutics, 
seeking a middle ground between these two traditions of research.45 
As to the need for such a method; Kuckartz criticises content analysis for being too 
eager to quantify, thus losing information, and hermeneutics is criticised on the other 
hand for being too flimsy and lacking in rigour.46  Therefore he sets out to create an 
alternative methodology, combining rigour and depth. 
 
Seeking to draw the best from both sides is a laudable exercise in itself. This method 
seeks to do just that. Drawing the best from content analysis means drawing 
categorisation techniques that renders the data more available to both reader and 
researcher. The more accessible the data is, the easier it is for the researcher to find 
the data that is relevant to the research question.  
First I will describe the side of qualitative text analysis providing more depth of 
knowledge; the interpretation of the data. Following that, I will describe the rigorous 
side, meaning categorisation, or coding. 
Interpreting 
Judging the relevance of the use of words is an interpretive exercise. So is the choice 
of which words to look for. The context of when the words are used may be as 
relevant as the frequency with which they1 are used. Qualitative text analysis seeks to 
learn from hermeneutics. Why? The word hermeneutics comes from the Greek word 
for interpret. Thus, hermeneutics is the study of interpretation.  
We use qualitative text analysis, because we wish to be able to interpret the text so as 
to extract meaning from it. Hermeneutics provides a framework for the understanding 
of the exercise of interpretation.  
 
                                                      
44 Kuckartz 2014 
45 Kuckartz 2014: Chapter 1 
46 ibid 
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Qualitative text analysis seeks also to draw the best from this study of interpreting. 
Interpretation provides an ability to extract more meaning from the data than purely 
quantitative markers are able to (as in pure content analysis). 
 
Hermeneutics can be defined in opposition to positivism as a method of 
understanding the human social world as a distinct thing from the rest of nature, 
because of the interpretation involved. There is no interpretation involved in natural 
systems; they can be viewed objectively – but in the human social world, meaning is 
created in a constant (iterative) interpretative process. One should, goes the argument, 
be aware of the subjective, interpretive character of investigations of the human social 
world and apply appropriately designed methods. 
Classical positivists argued, on the other hand, that the human social world should be 
analysed with the same methods as used in the science of nature – biology, physics, et 
cetera.47, 48,49 
 
The ontology of positivist social study is that the human world is indistinct from the 
natural world, and follows the same laws. Thus the two can be examined in the same 
way. Hermeneutic social study, on the other hand, follows constructivist ontology: the 
human social world is a distinctly human creation and thus requires a different 
perspective.50  
More specifically, in this paper the world is viewed as being made up of states. We 
can define these states as those that are internationally recognised; i.e. a state is a state 
insofar as other states recognise it as such. Thus they are social constructs.51 
 
Epistemologically, this paper is positioned on the interpretivist (or hermeneutic) side 
of the English School. As opposed to a realist (rationalist) epistemology that seeks to 
explain the world using material factors (such as military and economic power), an 
interpretivist epistemology explains the world using thought – and the expression of 
thought – language.52  
                                                      
47 Stanford University 2005 
48 Gialdino 2009 
49 Hekman 1983 
50 ibid 
51 Wheeler 2000 
52 Little 2000 
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This paper analyses the source material with a view to discovering if the Libyan 
intervention plays a role in the thoughts of those who formulate the P5’s respective 
foreign policies – to the extent that these thoughts are then transmitted and expressed 
through the representatives giving statements in the Security Council. Only on 
occasion are the ones responsible for foreign policy – heads of government and 
foreign ministers – present in the chamber; mostly they are diplomats without 
executive power. Nonetheless, insofar as there is clear communication between the 
diplomats and their superiors, and insofar as there is a candid debate in the Council, 
there is an opportunity to gauge, through words, what the political calculations of 
these states are.  
 
The hermeneutic circle invites us to ask as to the preconceptions of the researcher. 
How familiar is he/she with the subject? How foreign is it to him/her? Explicating the 
theoretical and literary background of any research is thus obviously crucial – not 
only to the reliability of the research, but also to the critical viewpoint of the 
researcher. If all humans have preconceptions, then so do research fields. Thus, the 
researcher will inevitably come with preconceptions. By outlining the literature 
review and theoretical framework, as seen above, the researcher describes the most 
relevant information on which these preconceptions are built, upholding a standard of 
transparency vital to any research. Thus the literature review in this paper. 
 
Hermeneutics invites us to separate discovery from application of codes; reading 
through the data material once, making notes in an open mindset, before turning to the 
application of codes that induces a different, and more closed, mindset. It encourages 
us to be open about the interpretive process that is inherent to research; indeed, to any 
meaning-making. 53 
Thus the coding process becomes (to a limited extent) iterative, in the image of the 
hermeneutic circle. For the research involved in writing this paper, this iterative 
principle was implemented such that a first reading and coding procedure was used to 
gauge to quality of the themes or categories used. A second round of coding was the 
performed with these refined codes.  
                                                      
53 ibid 
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Thematic coding 
From content analysis, qualitative text analysis draws rigour, and a systematic form 
of analysis using categorisation, or coding. There are a number of choices available as 
to which type of coding one is to use. The nature of the data that I will be analysing 
encourages thematic coding.  
 
The three themes are:  
- Non-intervention is the theme representing the pluralist argument; 
emphasising states’ rights. 
- Intervention relates to the solidarist argument, emphasising individual human 
rights. 
- Responsibility to Protect relates to arguments and statements involving the 
specific mention of R2P, and 
- Libya & regime change relates to statements referring to the Libyan 
intervention, and regime change. Since a crucial objection to the Libyan 
intervention is that a regime change took place, the two concepts are 
intimately connected in the context of the Security Council. They are thus one 
category; one argument, that I expect to find in the data. 
-  
The choice of themes are grounded in the review of literature and theory, and are 
drawn clearly from the research questions. The first two themes are immediately 
available in the theoretical framework: intervention and non-intervention referring to 
the two sides in the pluralist-solidarist debate. 
The category intervention does not include any intervention in the crisis that is outside 
the auspices of the UN. 
 
Responsibility to Protect and Libya & regime change are – as explained in the section 
research questions – expressions of the clash of the pluralist and solidarist sides of the 
debate; where the norms of non-intervention and human rights collide. 
 
Libya & regime change also relates directly to the problem formulation and as such is 
the most important category. The three remaining categories are used to gather data to 
elaborate and strengthen the conclusions of this paper. 
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This makes thematic analysis an obvious choice. In qualitative text analysis – as in 
content analysis – one looks for the occurrence of specific words. While in 
quantitative content analysis it is primarily the frequency that is interpreted on, 
qualitative text analysis also acknowledges the relevance of the context in which the 
words are spoken. It is possible to gauge the implicit meaning of words, sentences or 
paragraphs. In content analysis it is only possible to gauge the explicit meaning.  
Explaining: hypothetically, in a debate or exchange of words that deals exclusively 
Libya, one representative refers to specifics of Libya. The next refers to a general 
rule. China had a habit of doing so: speaking in general; in legalisms, when the rest 
would speak in specifics. Can we then take China’s statement as referring to Libya? 
Implicitly, yes. Explicitly, no. Qualitative text analysis makes it possible to assess the 
possibility that the Chinese representative was referring to Libya, and to discuss the 
ramifications if he/she indeed was. 
 
The final categories: 
• Intervention main 
o Intervention in Libya 
§ (Statements of the delegation of) China 
§ France 
§ Russia 
§ United Kingdom 
§ United States 
o Intervention in Syria  
§ China 
§ France 
§ Russia 
§ United Kingdom 
§ United States 
• Non-intervention main 
o Non-intervention Libya 
§ China 
§ France 
§ Russia 
§ United Kingdom 
§ United States 
o Non-intervention Syria 
§ China 
§ France 
§ Russia 
§ United Kingdom 
§ United States 
 
• Libya & regime change 
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• Responsibility to Protect 
o China 
o France 
o Russia 
o United Kingdom 
o United States 
 
How are these coded? Responsibility to protect does not need to be mentioned by 
name (as per the Hehir-Dunne & Gelber discussion). Some words are assumed to 
refer directly to it. The words are taken from the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN 
World Summit, when the R2P was adopted by the UN General Assembly.54 They are: 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
Segments will be coded under regime change when there is an explicit reference to 
the intervention in Libya and the regime change therein being grounds for arguing 
against an intervention in Syria. 
Segments are coded under non-intervention when they speak against any intervention 
in Syria or Libya – i.e. not just military intervention.  
Segments are coded under intervention when they speak of intervention in Syria or 
Libya in any way. 
The debate on intervention in Libya was coded, although purely for contextual 
purposes. It is coded under a different category than the debate on Syria. It is not a 
part of the analytical chapter. 
 
Meeting transcripts and resolutions were downloaded in PDF format, and loaded into 
the NVivo application. NVivo is an application specially built for the purpose of 
coding textual information from all types of documents, including transcripts.  
Coding involves assigning categories to particularly relevant segments of text. 
Categorisation is a process the human brain undertakes automatically and constantly 
in order to make sense of the world. Therefore the categorising can be said to begin 
even before the coding application has been loaded; thus the importance of outlining 
the theoretical and empirical background of the research. In this case the categories 
stem from the theoretical framework chosen for the paper. 
                                                      
54 UN World Summit 2005: Outcome Document 
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These themes, translated into categories and subcategories, will then be revised, and it 
will be elaborated how certain text segments are interpreted to be valid for coding 
under a given theme or subcategory.  
Categories may be fashioned both inductively and deductively, meaning that some 
may be created before the coding begins, with more added as the coding process 
provides additional insights. 
Things will inevitably fall outside the categories. The better the categories, the better 
they fit reality, and so the less relevant information falls outside of them. 
Thus, the paper will proceed to code statements from UN Security Council meetings 
and resolutions into the three themes; scrutinise the categories for any signs of a lack 
of coherence and need for the creation of sub-categories, after which a second round 
of coding will finalise the data collection. 
 
Kuckartz outlines an elaborate range of quality controls in chapter six. They are based 
on the classical criteria of objectivity, reliability and internal and external validity, 
although he uses different names:  
 
- For objectivity: conformability 
- For reliability: reliability, dependability and auditability 
- For internal validity: credibility and dependability 
- For external validity: transferability and adjustability 
 
Objectivity or conformability refers to the practice of the researcher maintaining a 
distance from the subject he or she is researching. Research is less about the 
subjective experience that is unique to each individual, than about producing results 
that conform to a certain standard. 
In this paper, a degree of objectivity of the researcher is maintained by the utilisation 
of transcripts rather than involving direct human contact. It is of course in practice 
impossible to attain absolute objectivity. The transparency of the paper in terms of its 
empirical and theoretical background and process the interpretation of the data aims 
to lay bare the preconceptions of the researcher, making the thought processes 
available to other researchers in the interest of a critical and constructive academic 
debate. 
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Reliability, dependability and auditability are concepts that relate to the basic 
methodological rigour of describing each step taken in the research, from the initial 
interest in the problem area, through to the formulation of research questions, choice 
of theory and methodology and the processes of data collection and analysis. 
The reliability of this report is secured through the use of data from a credible source 
– the United Nations. Is it possible that mistakes were made during the transcription 
in New York City? Of course; a few mistakes may happen – a systematically skewed 
data set is unlikely, though.  
 
The internal validity or credibility and dependability relates to the credibility of the 
conclusions; the interpretation of the data – the degree to which the reader can depend 
on them being logically coherent. 
The internal validity of this paper is to be secured through the use of tried and tested 
theoretical and methodological frameworks and general intellectual rigour. For the 
purpose of a transparent interpretive process, the analytical section involves lengthy 
quotations of the most important text segments that have been coded and analysed.55 
 
The external validity or transferability and adjustability relates to the degree to which 
it is possible to transfer the findings from this particular research programmes to 
others. Are they based on similar theoretical frameworks and/or methodologies? If 
not, to what extent, and what impact does that have on the capacity of one’s 
conclusions to be integrated into the literature? 
This paper draws on previous research and places itself in a contemporary debate, 
using similar theoretical framework and a rigorous methodology of the same type of 
data that for instance Dunne & Gelber have utilised.56, 57 
Data 
The data with which this paper will concern itself consists of those meetings of the 
UN Security Council that are headlined 
• ‘Syria’; 
• ‘Libya’; 
• The ‘Middle East situation’; 
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• ‘Peace and Security in Africa’; 
• ‘Protection of civilians in armed conflict’; 
• ‘General issues relating to sanctions’’ 
 
The data source is a series of transcripts of relevant meetings spanning a period 
between 1 January 2011 and 16 November 2015. The data has been chosen as the 
most reliable and accessible form of data on the debate within the Security Council. 
Restricting the data to that regarding to the Security Council does have an effect on 
the choice of methods. A discourse analysis would be an interesting choice of 
methods for another study as to the validity of applying a solidarist-pluralist 
perspective on the permanent Council members (and other states, if one wished to do 
so). Discourse analysis calls for a broader collection of data, including speeches and 
other public statements, and statements made in forums other than the Council. This 
paper has chosen to focus on the Council in its function as a significant decision-
making body. Using qualitative text analysis also was an opportunity to utilise a 
methodology that was covered in depth in the advanced social science methodology 
course, thus learning more about its value and application.  
 
What type of documents are these meeting transcripts? 
Following Prior, documents are not neutral or equal. UN meeting transcripts for 
instance are unlike the common social research interview transcript in the sense that 
they do not provide data on the emotional side of a discussion – for instance tone of 
voice, pauses and body language.58 UN transcripts are simply words translated into 
text. They are intended to be as neutral as possible.  
The documents are also marked provisional at the moment they are uploaded onto the 
United Nations website. The provisional documents are open to corrections from the 
states’ delegations. The official records are only available in print and are therefore 
unavailable for coding – unless one should type them all in by hand. Considering the 
amount of data – around 1000 A4 pages – this is clearly unrealistic. Even so, I do not 
expect there to be major revisions between the two. I expect the transcripts to be 
reliable to such a degree that they do not harm the paper overall. Lastly, official 
                                                      
58 Prior 2011 
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records are not yet available for the year 2015. Leaving out 2015 would have 
damaged the paper’s capacity to make relevant conclusions on this running debate.  
 
Words or deeds 
Now, one might legitimately ask: why study the words of politicians and diplomats? 
Do actions not matter more than words? Do they not lie and scheme wherever they 
see fit?59 Realists will certainly subscribe to the latter view. A premise of this paper is 
that, in international society, the words uttered constrain the actions of the agent60. 
States play a diplomatic and geopolitical game, and there are consequences if they do 
not follow the rules – at the extreme, one will be shamed and named a pariah, ones 
trade relations will suffer, alliances will fall apart and basic diplomatic ties cut off. 
Not surprisingly, states tend to follow the rules. 
This is a constructivist response to the realist view that states use language 
strategically – i.e. they will lie and subvert the rules whenever they see that it will 
further their (narrowly defined, material) interests. But the consequences of blatantly 
disregarding the rules can be significant: condemnation, sanctioning, even exclusion. 
Conversely, to reap the benefits of being a member of international society, the state 
must follow the rules.   
Explained in context, the state that legitimises an action using R2P must – according 
to the rules of the game, if you will – consequently (be able to) legitimise subsequent 
actions with the principles of R2P. If not, there will be consequences. 
Likewise, words can enable action. R2P helps enable governments to intervene in the 
affairs of other states by making it more legitimate. Illegitimate actions are met with 
negative consequences in any society, including the international one. Legitimate 
actions are not. 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of the theoretical chapter, this is precisely what norms 
also do: bind an actor to a certain way of acting, with consequences should the actor 
fail to abide by the norm. In this sense, language relating to the legitimacy of certain 
actions always refers to underlying norms. In this paper the language of the P5 is 
looked at with the aim of relating it to underlying norms within the theoretical 
framework: intervention (solidarism; justice) and non-intervention (pluralism; order) 
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Thus, words help shape the world. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the English 
School is that there is a dynamic relationship between words and actions; between the 
ideal and the material.  
Neither is a perfect constraint or enabler, however, and an analysis of both is 
important before one can conclude on what constitutes the operative norms of 
international society. 
 
Methodological considerations – during and after data collection 
Many documents proved to be irrelevant to the analysis, and thus were not coded. 
Many sittings were simply briefings to the Security Council that did not include 
debate on the topic, and some were on other topics than Syria and/or Libya.   
 
Only paragraphs containing information relevant to elucidating the positions of the P5 
were coded. Purely descriptive paragraphs were left out. 
As a rule, the whole paragraph in which a relevant statement was found was coded 
along with it in order to preserve context. More than once, several additional 
paragraphs were coded alongside the original one.  
After the initial reading and first round of coding, it became clear that the Libyan 
intervention’s effect on the debate happened largely through Russia, if also from 
China. Russia often referred to Libya in arguments against initiatives from the US, 
UK and France. Blocking vetoes came from Russia and China. The second round of 
coding therefore restricted the data to these five countries – the five permanent 
members of the Council, commonly known as the P5. Subcategories were also formed 
for each country.  
 
The category intervention was initially named human rights, but was renamed so as to 
effectively reflect the dialectic between states’ rights and non-intervention and human 
rights and intervention.  It also became clear during the first coding that the debate did 
not revolve only about military intervention, but about any intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other states. 
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It is important to note that this paper does not include analysis of the deliberations, in 
the Council, on whether to mandate air strikes in Syria on IS. This is a separate 
matter, one that does not confine itself to Syria. The Security Council reached an 
agreement on bombing IS on 20 November this year (following the Paris attacks of 13 
November).61 
 
Having described the methodology, we now turn to the analysis of the coded data. 
The data is presented in four sections, one pertaining to each category:  
• Libya & regime change 
• Non-intervention 
• Intervention 
• Responsibility to Protect 
Selected paragraphs are quoted (as representative of the wider category) and analysed. 
All documents referenced in the analytical section are available on the UN website. 
All categories and coded segments are available in the NVivo code file, as are the 
original documents. 
 
The analytical chapter focuses on statements from the Russian and Chinese 
representatives. From the data collected for this analysis it is clear that the Libyan 
intervention and its aftermath has affected the debate on intervention in Syria by 
affecting Russia and China. As two of the five veto-wielding permanent members of 
the Council, Russia and China have had a significant effect on the deliberations in the 
Council. 
  
 
Chapter	5:	Humanitarian	intervention		
In 2005 and 2006 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council 
respectively endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).62,63 It is as an attempt to 
codify what the UN’s response should be when there is a clash between the norm of 
not interfering in other states’ domestic affairs, and individual human rights; between 
the rights of the state and the rights of the individual.  
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R2P was first proposed in a 2001 report by the International Commission on 
Intervention and Sovereignty64 (ICISS). The ‘basic principle’65 of R2P is that: 
 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.66 
 
It was later adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at the World Summit in 
2005, as set out in the Outcome document67, paragraph 138-140.  
The controversial nature of R2P lies in the fact that it specifies when the non-
intervention norm (or ‘principle’) yields to the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians’ 
lives and basic human rights. An intervention of this sort may be called a 
humanitarian intervention. Bhikhu Paresh defines a humanitarian intervention as 
‘wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-
feeling’.68 
 
Humanitarian intervention as an idea can be traced back to the ancient Greek scholar 
Thucydides.69 As a practice, it was relatively established in the Western world already 
in the 19th century, when Britain, France and Russia intervened several times to 
protect Christians from persecution in the Ottoman Empire - though the motives could 
be said to be ambiguous in nature.70 The motives of those who launch humanitarian 
interventions today are also doubted by some – and as well shall see, also in the 
Libyan case.  
The word ‘intervention’ often refers to military intervention, of varying degrees: it 
can be the secure provision of aid (using the military), as in Kosovo 1999; an air 
bombardment of the forces of a violent regime, as in Libya 2011; or a peacekeeping 
mission, of which the biggest currently is in South Sudan.71 It is not the only way that 
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the international community can intervene in other states’ affairs. Sanctions and legal 
proceedings are both options more immediately available to the Security Council.  
 
Jumping forward, from the nineteenth century to the twentieth, and the Cold War era, 
interventions were mired in with-us-or-against-us Cold War thinking.72 National 
interest ranked above humanitarianism, famously illustrated by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s quip on the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio So moza Sr.: ‘He may be a 
bastard – but he’s our bastard.’73 
Somoza was viewed by Washington as an anti-communist stalwart; in the fight 
against communism, human rights often took a back seat. Washington has supported 
numerous illiberal governments over the years.74 In such cases, security, stability, and 
international order are prioritised above immediate concerns for human rights. As will 
be elaborated in the theoretical and analytical chapter, this is a trade-off that is well 
established in theoretical terms also. 
 
In the Cold War era, military humanitarian interventions were also highly 
controversial – partly because they tended to be seen in the light of the fight between 
East and West – as described by Nicholas Wheeler in his book Saving Strangers.75  
They were frequently met with condemnation, even in the face of clear humanitarian 
emergencies. 76  The Vietnamese intervention of Cambodia in 1978 resulted in 
widespread condemnation and the imposition of sanctions on Vietnam – even though 
the result of the invasion was to remove the bloody regime of the Khmer Rouge, who 
under the leadership of Pol Pot oversaw the deaths of several million Cambodians 
through mass executions, malnutrition and forced labour.77 
In the post-Cold War era, the legitimacy of the concept of humanitarian intervention 
grew, as did the frequency of interventions.78  
 
The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s primarily relied on Western forces.79 
From 2001 the War on Terror and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan preoccupied 
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the West, causing a lull in activity. The invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 
commandeered the most of the remainder of available Western resources. The 
American-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan largely ended in 2011 and 2014 
respectively.  
 
In 2011 a mandate was given by the UN for forces from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) to intervene in Libya in order to prevent imminent crimes 
against humanity (to be committed by the government).80  
What followed was an unprecedented 
military intervention. Running parallel 
to the intervention was an armed 
rebellion that toppled the Gaddafi 
regime, leading to a breakdown of the 
rule of law. In this vacuum various 
rebel groups took control each their 
parts of the country at gunpoint. To 
this day, the country is split into 
several parts, with two governments, 
minor local militia and the terrorist 
group known as the Islamic State (IS) 
all controlling significant territory.81 
 
The events that ultimately led to the intervention in Libya as well as the on-going war 
in Syria are known collectively as the Arab Spring. They are normally said to have 
begun in Tunisia, where protests broke out in mid-December 2010 over the poor 
economy – sparked by the self-immolation of a struggling street vendor who had been 
systematically harassed by local police.82 Eventually, the protests instigated a regime 
change. The ‘Spring’ spread to Egypt within a month, and in early February 2011, 
long-time President Mubarak resigned.  
Around the same time the Libyan ‘Spring’ exploded (or bloomed, as it were) with the 
advent of large protests against the Gaddafi regime. Security forces fired on the 
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Figure 1: Libya - September 2015. Source: The Economist 
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crowds in the second-largest city, Benghazi in mid-February 2011.83 Within days, 
opposition militia had taken control of Benghazi, and a fractious armed rebellion 
spread across the country. The rebels wished to see the removal of Gaddafi. The 
government refused, offering only a ceasefire, which the rebels in turn refused84. The 
country looked set to enter a lengthy civil war. The UN Security Council responded 
on 26 February with a resolution freezing the assets of Gaddafi and his family, but 
Gaddafi did not bow to the rebels’ demands.  
The stalemate was broken when, in March, forces loyal to the regime reached the 
rebel stronghold of Benghazi. An incoherent Gaddafi had earlier vowed to go ‘house 
to house’ and ‘cleanse Libya’, and the sudden advance of his forces along with these 
words provoked fears that a massacre would ensue once they reached the rebel 
stronghold of Benghazi.85 
 
On March 17 2011 the UN Security Council approved the use of ‘all necessary 
means’ to protect Libyan civilians.86 The mandate was historic, being the first to 
authorise intervention in the affairs of another state without the invitation of the host 
regime. 87  NATO forces duly intervened, destroying the regime’s forces and – 
controversially – electing to support select rebel groups.88, 89 Making the operation 
even more significant was the amount of military force applied, which had not been 
seen in a UN operation sine the Kosovo war, and the fact that the ruling regime of 
Muammar Gaddafi was toppled, the dictator ending his days in a lynching.90 
Soon after, many prominent members of the UN criticised the NATO forces for 
having severely misinterpreted the mandate given to them.91  
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As the intervention in Libya began 
winding down, the Syrian ‘spring’ 
gained in momentum. Protests were 
increasingly common. Hundreds of 
demonstrators were arrested, tortured 
and killed, and by late 2011 the 
country had already plunged into 
civil war. 92 On 4 October 2011, a 
draft resolution was tabled at the 
Security Council, condemning the 
human rights abuses of the Syrian 
regime and threatening sanctions 
should they not cease. It was vetoed 
by Russia and China.93, 94  
On 4 February 2012, a similar draft 
resolution was tabled and again 
vetoed by Russia and China on the 
grounds that it violated the sovereignty of the Syrian state. 95, 96 
 
Libya, Syria and the fear of chaos 
An important reason humanitarian intervention is so contentious is the fear of 
spreading secessionist tendencies – in common English, when governments lose their 
grip on a territory, militias, terrorists and others who do not want to be under the rule 
of the government will flood into the vacuum. The word secessionist refers to those 
who wish to secede from their mother country, creating a new state, and is a broad 
term that in essence refers to the fear of what nasty organisations will take power 
when governments fail to impose law and order. The Islamic State is one such 
organisation.97, 98 Some will privilege this fear higher than others – they fear the 
absence of order more than they fear the absence of justice. 
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Libya may have stoked this fear of chaos. Several militias have carved out their own 
territories in the vast but sparsely populated country.99, 100, 101 Similar scenarios have 
played out in Syria and Iraq.102 Weakening the regimes in place essentially creates 
legal no-mans-lands, where the rule of law is replaced by the rule of the gun.  
 
In an Arab world where AK-47 rifles are as ubiquitous as cars, where nations are 
young, and allegiances to them relatively weak compared to religious and tribal 
affiliations, it is not impossible to picture the Libyan, Iraq or Syrian scenario played 
out on a larger scale. A particular fear is that of giving Shia-Sunni hatred the room to 
ferment and explode (again).103 IS, for instance, is Sunni, and looks upon Shias as 
infidels to convert or murder.104 
The Sunni-dominated IS has massacred Shias in conquered areas and seek to create a 
caliphate bent on the murder of anyone not that is not Sunni Muslim – and in 
particular Shias, Christians and minority Muslim sects.105 These compose significant 
populations in Syria and Southern Iraq (as well as Iran).  
Should the regime in Syria fall, the terrorists and militias would in all likelihood gain 
further resources available to pursue further territorial expansion. IS already has 
resources available at a scale that is unprecedented for a terrorist group.106 
The risk, then, is that the pursuit of justice leads to the absence of order. This 
lawlessness – a vacuum, in a sense – would be filled with the Islamic State.  
This absence of order may lead to a complete disintegration of government power in 
the Middle East, leaving behind two 
things: 
 
• An expanding (Sunni) Islamic 
State funded by oil money and 
controlling large swathes of 
territory and a population of 
millions. 
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• A hotpot of minor tribal and/or militia-controlled territories funded by minor 
oil fields. 
 
IS would find a centrally located safe 
haven from which to expand and 
plan operations. As mentioned in the 
theoretical section, the impact of the 
Syrian civil war could expand across 
regions. Not only IS, but many other 
groups may find the lawless Syria 
(and parts of Iraq) as a useful base. 
IS may even absorb these groups. According to the Centre on Religion and 
Geopolitics, a research group under the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, a third of rebel 
fighters in Syria share ideology with IS.107  
Islamic insurgencies are active in the following regions in a belt stretching from 
Africa to China.  
These regions may be directly impacted by the Syrian civil war. IS aims to have these 
regions under control in a caliphate. Referring to the theoretical section; this is why 
the paper assumes a global-systemic perspective and not a regional one. Currently the 
following regions are affected by Islamist insurgencies.108 
 
• Russia 
o Chechnya 
o The North Caucasus 
• Central Asia 
o Afghanistan 
o Uzbekistan 
o Kyrgyzstan 
o Tajikistan 
o Pakistan 
• China 
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o Xinjiang Province 
• North Africa 
o Libya 
o Tunisia 
• The Middle East  
o Iraq 
 
Europe and parts of the Middle East are also affected by refugees in the millions.109 
With the context in order, we can continue to the analytical chapter. 
 
Chapter 6: Analytical chapter 
This chapter seeks to answer the two research questions with the data collected from 
transcripts of Security Council meetings covering the period from 1 January 2011 to 1 
December 2015: 
 
1. Which permanent members of the UN Security Council argue for intervening 
in Syria, and which argue against? 
2. To what extent do the arguments relate to: 
a. Regime change? 
b. Non-intervention? 
c. The Responsibility to Protect? 
d. Intervention? 
 
This will lead to a discussion as to what extent it is possible to answer the central 
problem formulation: 
 
Has the 2011 Libyan intervention and its aftermath influenced the debate on 
intervention in Syria? 
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Libya & regime change 
Russia and China have consistently voiced disapproval of the way in which NATO 
forces (led by the three major NATO powers and P5 members, the US, UK and 
France) implemented the UN mandate to intervene in Libya.  
Consider the first reference of the category ‘Regime change Libya’, coded from the 
6627th Council meeting of 4 October 2011. At this meeting a draft resolution was 
tabled that opened for the imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter of 
the United Nations.110 It was vetoed by Russian and China.111 
 
The Libyan intervention has a direct impact on Russian deliberations as to the 
appropriate action in Syria: 
 
The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately 
from the Libyan experience. The international community is alarmed by 
statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in 
the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in 
implementing the responsibility to protect. It is easy to see that today’s 
“Unified Protector” model could happen in Syria. 112 
 
Russia is alarmed that the intervention in Libya – codenamed ‘Unified Protector’ – 
could be ‘a model for the future’.113  
Later, in the same session, Russian representative Vitaly Churkin describes the 
Russian objection to the implementation of Resolution 1973 (authorizing military 
intervention). 
 
The demand for a quick ceasefire turned into a full-fledged civil war, the 
humanitarian, social, economic and military consequences of which 
transcend Libyan borders. The situation in connection with the no-fly 
zone has morphed into the bombing of oil refineries, television stations 
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and other civilian sites…These types of models should be excluded from 
global practices once and for all.114 
 
Resolutions 1970 (referring Libya to the ICC and imposing sanctions) and 1973 thus 
seem to have been implemented in a manner that Russia did not foresee and would 
not in any case have countenanced. The sovereignty of Libya has been violated in a 
much more extreme fashion than Russia had acquiesced to, in their view: civil war, 
and the bombing of civilian sites. These events eventually – gradually – led to the fall 
of the regime. Resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011. Gaddafi was killed 20 
October 2011. ‘These types of models should be excluded from global practices’, says 
the Russian representative. 
The Russian stance is not merely based on principle, but also on very real fears. A 
lawless Syria would (if it does not already) serve as a festering wound in the upper 
left shoulder of Middle East, spreading disease across the area. We see some of the 
consequences already now: myriad militant groups, some supported by Turkey, some 
by the United States, some by Russia, all fight for each their own cause – and/or that 
of their backers – at the cost of the civilian population.115,
 116 IS, probably the 
strongest actor, is free to expand into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Syrian 
state, which now only controls a few population centres on the Mediterranean coast.  
IS is also free to plan terrorist attacks elsewhere – even as far away as Europe, as was 
seen in Paris in November: the attacks were planned in Syria, says the French Prime 
Minister.117  
 
Also from the meeting on 4 October 2011 comes this quote: 
 
Our proposals for wording on the non-acceptability of foreign military 
intervention were not taken into account, and, based on the well-known events 
in North Africa, that can only put us on our guard. 
 
The Russian representative in the above statement refers to the events in North Africa, 
almost certainly referring to Libya. 
                                                      
114 UN Document S/PV.6627: 4 
115 BBC News 30 October 2015 
116 See also the map on page 6 of this paper. 
117 TIME Magazine 16 November 2015 
 39 
As outlined in the theoretical chapter, the pluralist perspective includes opposition 
against intervention, whether that be in the form of direct military intervention, the 
support of rebel forces in another country, and any other policies that involve 
changing the regime of another country. 
 
From the statement of the Russian representative in the debate on 22 February 2014: 
 
The Security Council decided relatively recently to consider the 
humanitarian situation in Syria, and only after it became clear that 
attempts to use the deterioration of the humanitarian situation to effect 
regime change were unsuccessful.118 
 
The Russian stance continues into 2014 and 2015, with a statement on 14 July 2014 
arguing that certain states are exploiting the crisis in Syria to ‘exert political pressure 
on the Syrian government and to implement interventionist agendas’, saying that 
Russia was ‘aware of this early’.119 
It continues in 2015 with statements on 24 April 2015 arguing the same, and that 
Libya has become a hub of criminal activity since the intervention, and that terrorists 
have found a base there from where they can spread into the wider Middle East.120  
Once again we see connection between Libya, Syria, and a wider fear of a breakdown 
of the rule of law in the Middle East. Russia prioritises the defence of the Syrian state. 
The US, UK and France share different priorities. 
Referring again to the theoretical chapter, Russia’s perspective is wholly in line with 
pluralism: defending order, stability and the status quo, arguing that the Syrian regime 
is a guarantor of this. The US, UK and France, in line with solidarism, emphasise the 
pursuit of justice. They do not want to take intervention off the table because they see 
it as a legitimate course of action. 
 
Summing up this section:  
• The Libyan intervention went further than Russia preferred. 
• Russia fear the same could happen in Syria. 
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• Statements made by the US, UK and France as to the illegitimacy of Bashar 
al-Assad add to this. 
 
The division within the P5 has widened because of the Libyan intervention. The US, 
UK and France seem to be as interventionist as ever, while Russia has become more 
cautious; more conservative – more pluralist. 
On China, regime change, and language:  
China has throughout the period surveyed kept a lower profile than Russia, in 
particular on regime change. Even so, it has voted in unison with Russia on all 
resolutions, and maintained, with Russia, the veto policy over enforcement action in 
regards to Syria. 
China’s statements are in general less prone to accusations than Russia’s. Its stance on 
a given issue is voiced in short, legalist, and general terms, often referring to previous 
statements.  
Consider for example the statement given on the floor of the Council 19 July 2012. It 
is one of the more explicit statements, and expresses the perhaps more distanced 
Chinese perspective on the issue: 
 
…sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations. China has no self-interest in the 
Syrian issue. We have consistently maintained that the future and fate of 
Syria should be independently decided by the Syrian people, rather than 
imposed by outside forces. We believe that the Syrian issue must be 
resolved through political means and that military means would achieve 
nothing.121 
 
China regularly refers to the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states, and to their preference for a political solution. Their stance is clear, principled, 
and clearly pluralist, emphasising sovereignty and non-interference.  
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The above is one of the most specific statements coming from China in the almost 
five years surveyed. Thus, the analysis tends to focus on statements from the Russian 
representatives, where more salient statements can be found.  
With this, we continue to the analysis of the category non-intervention. 
Non-intervention 
Throughout the period surveyed, the representatives of China and Russia have 
emphasized numerous times that the international society should, above all, respect 
Syria’s sovereignty: segments have been coded under the category non-intervention, 
Russia in 18 separate meetings, and under non-intervention, China in 24.122 
China and Russia reject the attempts by the UK, US and France to increase the 
Security Council’s leverage vis-à-vis the Syrian regime by threatening sanctions and 
even the use of military force.  They reject these proposals on the grounds that any 
solution should be political – which the rest of the P5 agree on – but purely between 
domestic parties; i.e. without the UN entering the conflict on either side. 
 
See for instance the statement made by Russia at the meeting on 4 October 2011:  
 
…at the heart of the Russian and Chinese draft was the logic of respect 
for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as 
ethe principle of non-intervention, including military, in its affairs…We 
deem unacceptable the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions against the 
Syrian authorities…Equally alarming is the weak wording in connection 
with the opposition and the lack of an appeal to them to distance 
themselves from extremists. Given the basis of statements by some 
Western politicians on President Al-Assad’s loss of legitimacy, such an 
approach could trigger a full-fledged conflict in Syria and destabilization 
in the region as a whole. The collapse of Syria as a result of a civil war 
would have a very destructive impact on the situation in the entire 
Middle East. 123 
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In this early debate we can see and/or trace already a number of Russian arguments: 
First, the collapse of Syria as a result of a civil war would have a ‘very destructive 
impact on the situation in the entire Middle East’. The absence of order in the Middle 
East is a concern for Russia (and China, apparently). It is a bigger concern than the 
absence of justice. They see its survival as vital to security and stability in the Middle 
East.  
Second, the statement emphasizes the respect for state sovereignty. The Russian 
representative expresses his desire for this respect to be expressed in any resolution 
that hopes to get his vote. This includes requiring the resolution to express that the 
Council distances itself from providing support to any other force than the sitting 
government of the Syrian Arab Republic. It also includes distancing itself from the 
threat of sanctions and other offensive measures against the regime. It is the clear 
opinion of Russia that the sitting government should be supported, not threatened. 
Above all, the statement is a defence of the privileging of the norm of state 
sovereignty. Prioritising state sovereignty and non-intervention is fundamental to the 
pluralist perspective. Pluralists prefer a conservative international society composed 
of states that do not interfere in the affairs of each other.  
 
Third, the priority of the US, UK and France is regime change. It worries Russia that 
their wording on the non-acceptability of military intervention was not accepted into 
the draft resolution. Also, the wording regarding the opposition/rebel forces is too 
weak, compared to the language condemning the regime for its breaches against 
international humanitarian law. Such a discrepancy could imply sympathy for the 
rebels and antipathy for the regime. Combined with the statements by their Western 
partners in the Council that President Assad has lost all legitimacy and should resign, 
Russia fears that the US, UK and France once again have a priority of regime 
change.124, 125 
This is a cardinal sin in the pluralist view. It is a serious breach of state sovereignty. 
In the solidarist view, it is justifiable in the name of defending human rights. Here, it 
is possible to trace the influence from the Kantian branch of the English School, with 
its conception of a world society; a world humanity undivided by states. Humans have 
a right and a responsibility to protect, as it were, each other from harm. The UN 
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policy called the Responsibility to Protect acknowledges this (if only in extreme 
cases).  
 
It seems that the US does not wish to take military intervention off the table. If not, 
they would surely have acquiesced to put in language on the ‘non-acceptability of 
foreign military intervention’, as seen in the first quotation in this section of the 
analysis. Russia (affected by the Libyan intervention) demands that it is explicitly 
taken off the table. It is obvious that the Libyan intervention has had a significant 
impact on the debate in this case; an impact through the more conservative-pluralist 
Russian position. Russia tacitly approved (by abstaining from the vote) of military 
intervention in Libya. It had severe objections to the way this intervention was 
realised. These objections revolved around breaches of state sovereignty. Now, in a 
similar situation – that of Syria – Russia is afraid that an intervention might once 
again effect a regime change, and wishes to have military intervention explicitly and 
completely taken off the table.  
 
Summarising: 
• Russia fears a loss of order in the Middle East. 
• China defends the Syrian state on principle. 
• Russia wishes for military intervention to be explicitly taken off the table so as 
to ensure that a Libyan situation does not occur again. This is refused by the 
US, UK and France. 
 
How has it affected the debate? The Libyan intervention effected excessive chaos in 
the country, Russia believes. The same methods could cause havoc all over the 
Middle East if they were to be applied in Syria. In the Russian view, NATO forces 
took the mandate to protect civilians with armed force much too far. It is unlikely that 
Russia will provide a similar mandate again in relation to the Syrian crisis, because of 
the Libyan situation. 
The Responsibility to Protect 
Three of the R2P-coded segments in relation to Libya were from statements by 
France, a generally very vocal supporter of the responsibility (and right) of the 
international society (or community) to intervene (not necessarily militarily) in Syria. 
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Consider the following statement from the meeting of 11 February 2011: 
 
When a Government attacks its own citizens, rather than protecting 
them, and when the crimes committed are an affront to the conscience of 
humankind and affect the stability of an entire region, the international 
community has the responsibility to intervene to protect civilians. That is 
what we did in Libya with resolution 1970 (2011). The imperative of 
ensuring justice, underscored in the resolution, continues to be valid 
today…As the violence in Syria and Yemen continues, the Council must 
reiterate its message as to the primacy of law and the need to combat 
impunity in all cases, just as it did following the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.126 
 
We can interpret the mention of responsibility to protect to mean that France sees a 
clear case for the Responsibility to Protect to be invoked in Syria as well, as it was in 
their eyes in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. Already on 26 July 2011 the French 
representative referred to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect 
having stated on 21 July that crimes against humanity might have been committed in 
Syria.127 France, the UK and the US repeatedly ask the Security Council to refer the 
matter to the ICC to investigate, but this is denied by the vetoes of Russia and 
China.128, 129 
Later, in the meeting of 19 August 2013, the French representative said that it is 
beyond doubt that the regime of Bashar al-Assad has committed crimes against 
humanity, and requested that the Council send ‘a clear message’.  
The United Kingdom stated on three occasions – one in 2013 and two in 2015 – that 
crimes against humanity had been committed by the regime, and has joined the 
requests for the matter to be referred to the ICC.130, 131, 132 The United States has 
mentioned the matter twice: once in 2011, and once in 2013.133, 134 
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It seems the Responsibility to Protect remains on the minds of the UK, US and 
France. The Libyan intervention has not affected these three countries’ attitude to R2P 
and military intervention. Russia and China have only one remark coded: in the 
meeting on 4 May 2011, the Russian representative welcomed the ICC’s efforts to 
investigate possible crimes against humanity in Libya.135 Attempts to refer Syria to 
the ICC have failed.136 Should the ICC conclude that crimes against humanity were 
committed by the Syrian regime, the case for intervention would be strengthened. 
Here, we can perhaps trace a change to Libya: Russia has taken a more pluralist 
position on Syria than was taken on Libya. We can deduce that this is due to the 
adverse consequences of the position they took on Libya naturally inducing more 
caution.  
Intervention 
The responsibility to protect can, if invoked, serve to legitimize military action, but 
there are many other ways for the international society to intervene in Syria. The 
category intervention includes all talk of the UN intervening in the crisis in Syria. For 
instance, several attempts have been made to refer the Syrian government to the 
International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. 
 
The Russian and Chinese fear is fanned by the other side’s denunciations of Bashar 
Al-Assad. The UK, US and France are clear in their wish to see him gone. They 
believe he has lost all legitimacy, and has ‘blood on his hands’. Consider the 
statement from the US representative at the meeting on 23 January 2013:  
 
We continue to support all Syrians, within and outside the Government, 
who aim to bring an end to the bloody Al-Assad regime and build a 
democratic and unified Syria in which the rule of law is respected. We 
will continue to seek the valuable contributions of the international 
community to that end.137 
 
The US is openly supporting forces in Syria that seek to effect regime change.  
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Along with the US and UK, France wants to see the Syrian regime prosecuted at the 
ICC.138, 139, 140, 141, 142  
Later in the same statement, the French representative also brings to light an 
interesting view regarding stability in the Middle East. 
 
…I should like to pay tribute to the courage of all those women and men 
who continue, after months of bloody repression, to call for freedom in 
Syria. Only an effective response to those aspirations can restore 
stability to that country, on which depends the stability of a fragile 
region.143 
 
France is not prioritizing justice over order; but sees the Syrian case as one of those 
sweet spots where the two do not exclude each other. As mentioned in the theoretical 
chapter, echoing Nicholas Wheleer (and Tony Blair) ‘there is often a mutual 
compatibility between protecting the national interest, promoting international order, 
and enforcing human rights.’ 144, 145 Thus, France believes an intervention in the 
Syrian civil war can promote order as well as justice. The existence of this mutual 
compatibility is a key argument of Nicholas Wheeler’s book, which is by and large a 
book-length argument in favour of solidarism. It is clear, though, that the Russians 
and Chinese do not share this view, as seen above. In this view, the French risk order 
by pursuing justice. Russia indeed has explicitly said that supporting the regime 
(rather than toppling it) is the best way to preserve order in the region.146 Preserving 
the status quo in the name of stability is, as explained in the theoretical chapter, a 
basic tenet of pluralism. Thus, a clear division is again made clear, between a 
solidarist France and a pluralist Russia.  
 
While the UK agrees with Russia and China that a so-called political solution is the 
only solution, they wish to apply pressure on the government in order to increase its 
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incentive to make arrangements for peace with the rebels.147, 148, 149 Attempts at 
dialogue from the regime have so far been unsuccessful. Syria’s government has 
ignored the Council, says the UK representative in the statement quoted below. 
Therefore the US, UK and France have wished to threaten the regime with sanctions 
in order to bring it to the negotiating table. In the meeting of 21 April 2012 the US 
representative states – referring to the Syrian government’s lack of compliance with 
demands to cease violating the human rights of its citizens: 
 
The Syrian Government has ignored the Council. In the United States, 
our patience is exhausted…we, our allies and others in this body are 
planning and preparing for those actions that will be required of all of us 
if the Al-Assad regime persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people.150 
 
On 25 June the same year: 
 
It is a shame that the Council continues to stand by rather than to stand 
up. We must take meaningful steps, including by imposing binding 
sanctions under Chapter VII, to pressure the Syrian regime to comply 
with the Joint Special Envoy’s six-point plan and work towards a 
political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian 
people.151 
 
The ‘political solution’ that Russian and Chinese representatives refer to numerous 
times in the meetings thus refers to a political solution other than the one referred to 
by the UK and US as seen above; that is, a political solution absent the involvement 
of foreign governments and the international community. We see again here the 
predicted division between those who defend the territorial sovereignty of the Syrian 
state and the norm of non-intervention in domestic affairs, and those who would 
rather see the UN intervene in the conflict in order to push for a solution. This 
intervention would be in the form of an international court order, or the imposition of 
sanctions. 
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One interventionary measure that the P5 agree on is the supply of humanitarian aid – 
however, as per Russia, it may not be delivered by armed forces, raising questions of 
security.152 Many members of private aid organisations have been killed in Syria.153 
Governments may have issues with sending aid in with the protection only of the 
Syrian Armed Forces, which only controls a small part of the country. 
 
Summing up this section: 
 
• The US, UK and France are opposed to the Assad regime. 
• They prioritise the protection of civilians that ‘stand against’ the regime. 
• The Syrian government has ‘exhausted’ their ‘patience’. 
o Therefore it is time to intervene in the conflict using the ICC, 
sanctions, and, by not excluding it, implying that even armed force is on 
the table. 
 
The Libyan intervention has not affected this side of the debate. The US, UK and 
France continue to see intervention as the solution. From the previous sections we 
know that Russia and China have moved away from this attitude. Thus the division 
among the P5 has widened. This has been the effect of the Libyan intervention. I will 
now elaborate on this, sum up the findings and conclude on the paper as a whole in 
the concluding remarks.   
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Chapter	7:	Summary	of	the	findings	
The Libyan intervention has resulted in a more cautious, pluralist Russia. Russian 
representatives have expressed the opinion that the NATO forces interpreted 
Resolution 1973 in a significantly different manner than anticipated. The 
consequences were beyond what Russia could accept. One might say there has been a 
breach of trust. Russia fears that the US, UK and France wish to apply the same 
model in Syria as they did in Libya. The connection between the two crises is 
strengthened by the opposition of the US, UK and France to the current Syrian 
regime. Russia has made it clear that the Libyan intervention has had an effect on 
their position. Russian representatives explicitly refer to the Libyan intervention as 
grounds for their decision in three separate meetings: 10 April 2011; 24 April 2015; 
12 May 2015.  
This is how the Libyan intervention has affected the debate regarding intervention in 
Syria: by affecting Russia. 
 
Since Chinese representatives do not explicitly reference the Libyan intervention as 
being grounds for their position, it is likely that their stance is based more on 
principle. The more legalist language used could suggest just that. The Chinese stance 
is otherwise similar to Russia’s, as is the voting record. Theoretically, Chinese 
opposition to intervention is a coherent, pluralist opposition. China did not, however, 
express specific objections to intervention in Libya or Syria. It is not possible to 
conclude that China’s position has been affected by the Libyan intervention. Neither 
is there any data that suggests that the debate has been affected by the Libyan 
intervention through affecting the US, UK and France.  
 
The opposition is not only based on principle. Russia’s representatives see above all a 
significant degrading of order in Libya as a result of the 2011 Libyan intervention. 
Russia believes that a Syrian intervention would further degrade order. Not just in 
Syria, but in the wider region. They see the Libyan case not as a victory for justice, 
but as a loss of order.   
France, on the other hand, believes that order is in fact best secured through an 
intervention that would, in this view, enforce international humanitarian law (justice). 
In France’s view, the situation is an example of a situation in which there is a mutual 
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compatibility between order and justice. One might say that France believes that if the 
Syrian regime can get away with denying human rights, then the rule of law is void. 
Indeed, in the end it comes back to the question of when exactly one norm trumps the 
other. The Responsibility to Protect was an attempt to specify a point where one 
trumped the other, but it seems it was unsuccessful.  
Both Russia and China emphasise that foreign intervention in domestic affairs is 
against the Charter of the United Nations; specifically, the principle of non-
intervention. The Responsibility to Protect, however, opens for the waiver of the norm 
of non-intervention. As quoted on page one of this paper: 
 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.154 
 
Actual debate or discussion on whether or not the situation meets these terms has 
been absent. The US, UK and France believe that they are; Russia and China do not 
mention them. This is a significant finding: Russia and China, along with the rest of 
the UN, has endorsed the R2P. Do they no longer recognise its legitimacy? Why? 
Further research could investigate if such discussion was commonplace before the 
Libyan intervention, and from there perhaps conclude on the present relevance of 
R2P.  
There have been statements (as seen in the previous section) that rhetorically open the 
way for a military intervention, but talk of other methods of intervening has 
dominated the debate. This includes referring the matter to the ICC, and imposing 
sanctions.  There is a split in the Security Council on the matter of intervention that 
we are able to position within the theoretical framework, seeing the P5 as consisting 
of three solidarist-leaning states (the UK, US and France) and two pluralist-leaning 
states (Russia and China). One side sees no need for any intervention at all in Syria; 
the other will take no options off the table. 
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The US, UK and France have long called for the UN to act to enforce international 
humanitarian law in Syria via the ICC and the threat of sanctions.155, 156, 157, 158, 159  
Russia acknowledges that international humanitarian law has been broken in Syria but 
has not, however, approved any enforcement action.160 This difference of opinion 
goes to the heart of what the two sides believe international society should be, and 
what it should do. Should international society police the planet, or should it leave 
policing to the domestic parties? The 2011 Libyan intervention has served to 
exacerbate these differences; or at least bring them into the open. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
So, finally, how does the data collected answer the central problem formulation? 
 
Has the 2011 Libyan intervention and its aftermath influenced the debate 
on intervention in Syria? 
 
It is clear that the Libyan intervention, and its aftermath, has had an influence on the 
debate among the P5 regarding an intervention in Syria. It is referenced in several key 
debates in the Security Council. The arguments that Russia on the floor of the Council 
express as reasons for vetoing interventionist resolutions can be traced back to Libya, 
theoretically as well as empirically.  
 
As to how the paper inserts itself in the literature: 
This paper has delivered a rigorous analysis of nearly five years of debate in the 
United Nations Security Council over the prospect of intervening in Syria. It has 
shown that the Libyan intervention has had an impact on Russia’s stance on Syria. 
This contradicts what English School researcher Alex Bellamy, of the University of 
Queensland, has found.161 Bellamy cites two key reasons for the action (or rather 
inaction) of the Council on Syria:  
 
(1) there are some problems that do not have feasible near-term 
solutions, and (2) the Council is “not above the vagaries of international 
politics. Indeed it is all about politics: local, national, regional and 
global.” It is the complex politics within and surrounding Syria that 
seems to hold the key, not the political fallout from Libya.162 
 
This paper was inspired by Bellamy’s findings, presented in the quoted article. His 
examination of the voting records and statements in the Security Council found that 
Libya did not have an impact. This paper has found that does suggest that Libya has 
had an impact. It does not look like a ‘red herring’.163 Bellamy’s examination of 
Council statements distinguishes between explicit mentions of Libya, and ‘pragmatic 
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arguments’.164 This paper has established a theoretical link between Libya and those 
‘pragmatic arguments’. 
However, Bellamy analyses not only language, but the practice of the Security 
Council as well. This paper merely analyses the arguments used on the floor of the 
Council. Bellamy writes that ‘had Libya been among the principal factors behind 
voting patterns on Syria’, one would have expected more of those states criticising the 
Libyan intervention also voting against the resolutions on Syria.165 ‘After all, why 
would the Libya precedent matter more to Russia than India?’166 And, indeed, China, 
one might add – Bellamy does not mention why China might wish to follow the 
voting pattern against intervention, (as it does). 
Bellamy regards the practice of the Security Council as proof of the lack of 
connection, citing that the Council has used R2P language in resolutions 10 times in 
the period 2011-2014. 167  These other cases include Mali, the Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire  and Yemen. A look at the statements made on the floor of 
the Council, as in this paper, suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, this paper has not 
analysed these cases. What is it that seems to make it unique? Is it the factor of 
regime change? Is regime change the one thing Russia and China will not tolerate? 
An examination of more cases in which the Council has provided a mandate for 
intervention – such as invoking R2P – is warranted to answer this question.  
Finally, let it be said that this paper does not argue that national interests play no role 
in why states act as they do – this is simply not up for analysis in this paper. That is a 
topic for other papers.  
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Afterthoughts 
The analysis leaves a picture of a group of strategic rivals fighting in a small sandbox: 
battling where their interests collide, cooperating where they intertwine. It is not a 
picture of a united international community. Is this a consequence of the intervention 
in Libya? Other factors such as the move to accept Ukraine into NATO and the EU, 
may have played a part – but it could be argued that a unified international 
community approved (even if Brazil, India, Germany, China and Russia all abstained) 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973, but were disunited by the implementation of them. A 
high point in the development of the international society; an opportunity for future 
coherence squandered.  
 
On the success of the choice of theory for the research, the pluralist-solidarist 
dichotomy has proven to be an excellent choice. It clearly reflects reality. The theory 
is an expression of a clash between human rights and states’ rights, a clash that is 
clearly present in the minds of the state representatives in the Security Council 
(recalling, again, Buzan’s three ways of seeing the framework).  
 
On the choice of methodology, the evolution of the theoretical framework for this 
paper invited the use of thematic coding, which has proved a worthy method. Coding 
under the three themes – one representing the pluralist (non-intervention), one the 
solidarist (intervention), and one the codified expression of the clash between the two 
(the Responsibility to Protect) – made the analysis of the positioning within the 
Security Council a relatively straightforward task. This owes also to the fact that the 
positions among the P5 settled itself neatly in two camps. 
 
Finding Russia to be such an important actor supports the use of a global-systemic 
perspective, rather than focussing on a regional organisation such as the Arab League 
(that does not include Russia). 
 
Recalling Tony Blair and Nicholas Wheeler’s talk of sweet spots, interesting research 
might be made as to where these sweet spots might lie.168, 169 This would involve a 
theoretically founded weighing of consequences as to order, justice and national 
                                                      
168 Tony Blair: 1999 
169 Wheeler 2000: 267 
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interest. Also, recalling France’s seeing such a sweet spot in the Syrian situation; 
using other data sources, is this an established view in France, the UK and the US? Is 
it a prerequisite for interventions?  
 
This paper has mapped the attitudes of the P5 members over the years 2011-2015 
within the theoretical framework. It is possible to use this as a basis for further 
research into the evolution of the pluralist-solidarist debate and divide in the P5, 
looking both to the past and to the future. It is also possible to use it as a reference 
point for studies into other cases than the Syrian. Further research into the Libyan 
case, and how previous experiences played a role in the decisions leading up to 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973, could also benefit the field of research. A full research 
programme looking into the learning process of the P5 could even be envisioned. A 
wider source material could open the way for generalisations as to what the state of 
the pluralist-solidarist divide means for the future. Does the P5 learn from the past?170 
This paper has suggested that at least Russia does.  
 
  
                                                      
170 The use of the word ‘learn’, here, as in the title, is not meant to suggest any normative views on the part of the researcher. 
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